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This thesis provides evidence on two research questions regarding the independent influence 
of CFOs on firms’ financial reporting. Chapter 2 examines the effect of relative CFO power 
on financial reporting integrity and Chapter 3 investigates changes in financial reporting 
integrity surrounding routine versus non-routine CFO turnover. The primary proxy for 
financial reporting integrity is the recognition of non-current asset impairments in response to 
indicators of impairment which remains a key focus area of regulatory scrutiny and inquiry.  
Based on a sample of 1,781 Australian firm-years over the period 2007 to 2015, the evidence 
in Chapter 2 illustrates that firms record less timely non-current asset impairments (in the 
presence of adverse economic circumstances and worsening financial performance) as the 
degree of relative CFO power increases. 463 Australian CFO changes between 1 July 2007 
and 30 June 2015 are examined in Chapter 3 which finds that new CFOs use asset write-offs 
as a vehicle to engage in ‘big bath’ accounting in the year of a non-routine appointment. The 
results in Chapter 3 also indicate that (irrespective of the nature of the CFO change) CFOs 
bias earnings upward in the period prior to their departure. The results are consistent with 
respect to a number of sensitivity tests and alternative proxies for financial reporting 
integrity. 
While CFOs, therefore, have the capacity to exert independent influence over firms’ reported 
results the balance of findings suggest that CFOs act in self-interest. In other words, CFOs’ 
financial reporting decisions are opportunistically motivated by their own compensation and 
career incentives and the personal costs they face. The evidence in this thesis is, therefore, 
contrary to the view that CEO pressure is a primary driver of CFOs’ involvement in earnings 
manipulation. 
 
